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Abstract. We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging
to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a
win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing what is the preferable behavior of
Player 1 from those states.
Along the way, we prove several results of theoretical and practical interest, such as a charac-
terization of admissible strategies, which also provides a simple algorithm for computing such
strategies for various common goals, and the equivalence between the existence of positional
winning strategies and the existence of positional subgame perfect strategies.
1 Introduction
Games played on finite graphs have been widely investigated in Computer Science, with
applications including controller synthesis [PR89,ALW89,MPS95,dAFMR05], protocol veri-
fication [KR01,BBF07], logic and automata theory [EJ91,Zie98], and compositional software
verification [dAH01].
In such games, we are given a finite graph, whose set of states is partitioned into Player 1
and Player 2 states, and a goal, which is a set of infinite sequences of states. The game consists
in the two players taking turns at picking a successor state, giving rise to an ever increasing
and eventually infinite sequence of states. A (deterministic) strategy for a player is a function
that, given the current history of the game (a finite sequence of states), chooses the next state.
A state s is said to be winning if there exists a strategy that guarantees victory regardless
of the moves of the adversary, if the game starts in s. A state that is not winning is called
losing.
The main algorithmic concern of the classical theory of these games is determining the set
of winning states. In this paper, we shift the focus to losing states, since we claim that many
applications would benefit from a theory of best-effort strategies which allowed Player 1 to
play in a rational way even from losing states.
For instance, many game models correspond to real-world problems which are not really
competitive: the game is just a tool which enables to distinguish internal from external non-
determinism. In practice, the behavior of the adversary may turn out to be random, or even
cooperative. A strategy of Player 1 which does not “give up”, but rather tries its best at
winning, may in fact end up winning, even starting from states that are theoretically losing.
For instance, such is the case in [dAFMR05], where games are used to model the interaction
between the scheduler of an operating system and the applications being scheduled.
In other cases, the game is an over-approximation of reality, giving to Player 2 a wider set
of capabilities (i.e., moves in the game) than what most adversaries actually have in practice.
Again, a best-effort strategy for Player 1 can thus often lead to victory, even against an
adversary which is strictly competitive.
In this paper, we consider and compare several alternative definitions of best-effort strate-
gies. As a guideline for our investigation, we take the application domain of automated ver-
ification and synthesis of open systems. Such domain is characterized by the fact that, once
good strategies for a game have been found, they are intended to be actually implemented
in hardware or software. As a consequence, we tend to favor best-effort criteria that are as
discriminating (i.e., specific) as possible while still giving rise to efficient strategies. While
having such application domain in mind, we still put the main focus of the present work
on theoretical issues, leaving to future investigations a discussion of what criterion is more
suitable for any specific application.
Best-effort strategies. The classical definition of what a “good” strategy is states that
a strategy is winning if it guarantees victory whenever the game is started in a winning
state [Tho95]. This definition does not put any burden on a strategy if the game starts
from a losing state. In other words, if the game starts from a losing state, all strategies are
considered equivalent.
A first refinement of the classical definition is a slight modification of the game-theoretic
notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium [OR94]. Cast in our framework, this notion states that
a strategy is good if it enforces victory whenever the game history is such that victory can
be enforced. We call such strategies strongly winning, to avoid confusion with the use of
subgame (and subarena) which is common in computer science [Zie98]. It is easy to see
that this definition captures the intuitive idea that a good strategy should “enforce victory
whenever it can” better than the classical one.
s0 s1 s2
Fig. 1: A game where victory
cannot be enforced.
Next, consider games where victory cannot be en-
forced at any point during the play. Take the Bu¨chi game
in Figure 1 1, whose goal is to visit infinitely often s0. No
matter how many visits to s0 Player 1 manages to make,
he will never reach a point where he can enforce victory.
Still, it is intuitively better for him to keep trying (i.e.,
move to s1) rather than give up (i.e., move to s2). To
capture this intuition, we consider two further notions of
best-effort strategy.
One such notion which is well known in the literature is the one of optimal strategy in a
particular type of game called a Markov Decision Process (MDP). In such a game (also called
1.5-player game), Player 2 plays according to a fixed distribution over successor states. Thus,
each strategy of Player 1 gives rise to a stochastic process, i.e. to a distribution over infinite
sequences of states. Given a goal, one may then ask which is the strategy of Player 1 which
maximizes the probability of satisfying the goal. There are known algorithms for solving this
problem for various classes of goals [BdA95].
1 Player 1 states are represented by circles and Player 2 states by squares.
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The notion of optimal strategy suggests a first solution to our original problem of dealing
with losing states in a 2-player game. We can assume that Player 2 plays uniformly at random
and compute an optimal strategy for Player 1. Although this approach may be of interest
to some cases, it is worth considering alternative criteria, which do not make as strong an
assumption on the behavior of Player 2. One such criterion is derived from the classical game-
theoretic notion of dominance [OR94]. Given two strategies σ and σ′ of Player 1, we say that
σ dominates σ′ if σ is always at least as good as σ′, and better than σ′ in at least one case.
Dominance induces a strict partial order over strategies, whose maximal elements are called
admissible (or undominated) strategies. In Section 3, we prove that a strategy is admissible
if and only if it is simultaneously strongly winning and cooperatively strongly winning (i.e.,
strongly winning with the help of Player 2).
We claim that admissible strategies represent a convincing notion of best-effort strategy.
Similarly to optimality in a 1.5-player game, this notion is goal-independent. Moreover, it
does not make any assumption on the behavior of Player 2. Dominance can also be useful for
multi-criteria optimization problems. Differently from stochastic optimality, dominance gives
rise to a partial order over strategies, which leaves room for another goal to be pursued.
Memory. A useful measure for the complexity of a strategy consists in evaluating how much
memory it needs regarding the history of the game. In the simplest case, a strategy requires no
memory at all: its decisions are based solely on the current state of the game. Such strategies
are called positional or memoryless [GZ05]. In other cases, a strategy may require the amount
of memory that can be provided by a finite automaton (finite memory), or more [DJW97].
The memory measure of a strategy is particularly important for the applications that we
target in this paper. Since we are interested in actually implementing strategies in hardware
or software, the simplest the strategy, the easiest and most efficient it is to implement.
We devote Section 4 to studying the memory requirements for various types of “good”
strategies. In particular, we prove that all goals that have positional winning strategies also
have positional strongly winning strategies. We also prove that for prefix-independent posi-
tional goals, all positional winning strategies are automatically strongly winning. The latter
property is not valid for all positional goals. Thus, new algorithms are still needed to compute
strongly winning strategies.
The situation is different for admissible strategies: there are games with positional goals
that have no positional admissible strategy. Again, prefix-independent goals are particularly
well-behaved: those that admit positional winning strategies also admit positional admissible
strategies, as we show by presenting a simple algorithm which computes positional admissible
strategies for these goals.
2 Definitions
We treat games that are played by two players on a finite graph, for an infinite number of
turns. The aim of the first player is to obtain an infinite trace belonging to a fixed set of
winning traces, while the aim of the second player is the exact opposite. In the literature, such
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games are termed two-player, turn-based, qualitative and zero-sum. The following definitions
make this framework formal.
A game is a tuple G = (S1, S2, δ, C, F ) such that: S1 and S2 are disjoint finite sets of
states; let S = S1∪S2, we have that δ ⊆ S×S is the transition relation and C : S → N is the
coloring function, where N denotes the set of natural numbers including zero. Finally, F ⊆ Nω
is the goal. With an abuse of notation, we extend the coloring function to paths in the game
graph, with the obvious meaning. We assume that games are non-blocking, i.e. each state has
at least one successor in δ. Formally, G′ = (S1, S2, δ
′, C, F ), where δ′∩ (S1×S) = δ∩ (S1×S)
and δ′ ∩ (S2 × S) ⊆ δ ∩ (S2 × S).
A (finite or infinite) path in G is a (finite or infinite) path in the directed graph (S1∪S2, δ).
If a finite path ρ is a prefix of a finite or infinite path ρ′, we also say that ρ′ extends ρ. We
denote by first(ρ) the first state of a path ρ and by last(ρ) the last state of a finite path ρ.
Strategies. A strategy is a function σ : S∗ → S such that for all ρ ∈ S∗, (last(ρ), σ(ρ)) ∈ δ.
Our strategies are deterministic, or, in game-theoretic terms, pure. We denote ΣG the set of
all strategies in G. We do not distinguish a priori between strategies of Player 1 and Player 2.
However, for sake of clarity, we write σ for a strategy that should intuitively be interpreted
as belonging to Player 1, and τ for the (rare) occasions when a strategy of Player 2 is needed.
Consider two strategies σ and τ , and a finite path ρ, and let n = |ρ|. We denote by
OutcG(ρ, σ, τ) the unique infinite path s0s1 . . . such that (i) s0s1 . . . sn−1 = ρ, and (ii) for all
i ≥ n, si = σ(s0 . . . si−1) if si−1 ∈ S1 and si = τ(s0 . . . si−1) otherwise. We set OutcG(ρ, σ) =⋃
τ∈ΣG
OutcG(ρ, σ, τ). For all s ∈ S and ρ ∈ OutcG(s, σ), we say that ρ is consistent with σ.
Similarly, we say that OutcG(s, σ, τ) is consistent with σ and τ . We extend the definition of
consistency from infinite paths to finite paths in the obvious way.
A strategy σ is positional (or memoryless) if σ(ρ) only depends on the last state of ρ.
Formally, for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ S∗, if last(ρ) = last(ρ′) then σ(ρ) = σ(ρ′).
Dominance. Given two strategies σ and τ , and a finite path ρ, we set valG(ρ, σ, τ) = 1 if
C(OutcG(ρ, σ, τ)) ∈ F , and valG(ρ, σ, τ) = 0 otherwise. Given two strategies σ and σ
′, we
say that σ′ dominates σ if: (i) for all τ ∈ ΣG and all s ∈ S, valG(s, σ
′, τ) ≥ valG(s, σ, τ), and
(ii) there exist τ ∈ ΣG and s ∈ S such that valG(s, σ
′, τ) > valG(s, σ, τ).
It is easy to check that dominance is an irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive relation.
Thus, it is a strict partial order on strategies.
Uniform stochastic games. In this presentation, a uniform stochastic game (USG) is
syntactically equivalent to a game. However, its semantics is different: in a USG G =
(S1, S2, δ, C, F ), in states in S1 Player 1 chooses the successor state, while in S2 the suc-
cessor is chosen according to a uniform distribution over all successors. A USG is thus a
Markov Decision Process. A state s and a strategy σ induce a stochastic process which is a
Markov chain. We denote Prσs (X) the probability of event X in the Markov chain generated
by σ that starts at s. For more information on stochastic processes, see [FV97].
Given a strategy σ and a state s, and assuming that F is a measurable subset of Nω,
we denote valG(s, σ) the probability of winning using σ from state s, that is Pr
σ
s ({ρ ∈ S
ω |
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C(ρ) ∈ F}). We say that a strategy σ∗ is optimal if it maximizes the probability of winning,
from all states. Formally, for all states s, we require valG(s, σ
∗) = supσ∈ΣG valG(s, σ).
2.1 Good Strategies
In the following, unless stated otherwise, we consider a fixed game G = (S1, S2, δ, C, F ) and
we omit the G subscript whenever the game is clear from the context.
Let ρ be a finite path in G, we say that a strategy σ is winning from ρ if, for all ρ′ ∈
Outc(ρ, σ), the color sequence of ρ′ belongs to F . We say that ρ is winning if there is a
strategy σ which is winning from ρ. The above definition extends to states, by considering
them as length-1 paths. A state that is not winning is called losing.
Further, a strategy σ is cooperatively winning from ρ if there exists a strategy τ such
that the color sequence of the unique infinite path Outc(ρ, σ, τ) belongs to F . We say that
ρ is cooperatively winning if there is a strategy σ which is cooperatively winning from ρ.
Intuitively, a path is cooperatively winning if the two players together can extend that path
into an infinite path that satisfies the goal. Again, the above definitions extend to states, by
considering them as length-1 paths.
We can now present the following set of winning criteria. Each of them is a possible
definition of what a “good” strategy is.
– A strategy is winning if it is winning from all winning states. This criterion intuitively
demands that strategies enforce victory whenever the initial state allows it.
– A strategy is subgame perfect if it is winning from all winning paths. This criterion states
that a strategy should enforce victory whenever the current history of the game allows it.
– A strategy is strongly winning if it is winning from all winning paths that are consistent
with it.
– A strategy is cooperatively winning (in short, c-winning) if it is cooperatively winning from
all cooperatively winning states. This criterion essentially asks a strategy to be winning
with the help of Player 2.
– A strategy is cooperatively subgame perfect (in short, c-perfect) if it is cooperatively win-
ning from all cooperatively winning paths.
– A strategy is cooperatively strongly winning (in short, cs-winning) if it is cooperatively
winning from all cooperatively winning paths that are consistent with it.
– A strategy is admissible if there is no strategy that dominates it. This criterion favors
strategies that are maximal w.r.t. the partial order defined by dominance.
– A strategy is optimal if it is so in the corresponding uniform stochastic game. This criterion
endorses strategies that are optimal, assuming that the adversary chooses her moves
according to a uniform distribution.
The notions of winning, optimal and cooperatively winning strategies are customary to
computer scientists [Tho95,AHK97]. The notion of subgame perfect strategy comes from
classical game theory [OR94]. The introduction of the notion of strongly winning strategy
is motivated by the fact that in the target applications game histories that are inconsistent
with the strategy of Player 1 cannot occur. Being strongly winning is strictly weaker than
being subgame perfect. In addition, there are games for which there is a positional strongly
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winning strategy, but no positional subgame perfect strategy (see Figure 8 in the Appendix).
The term “strongly winning” seems appropriate since this notion is a natural strengthening
of the notion of winning strategy.
We say that a goal F is positional if for all games G with goal F , there is a positional
strategy that is winning in G. Recently, necessary and sufficient conditions for a goal to be
positional were identified [GZ05].
3 Comparing Winning Criteria
In this section, we compare the winning criteria presented in Section 2.1, taking as the main
reference the definition of winning strategy. Figure 2 summarizes the relationships between
the winning criteria under consideration. We start by stating the following basic properties.
Lemma 1. The following properties hold:
1. all strongly winning strategies are winning, but not vice versa;
2. all subgame perfect strategies are strongly winning, but not vice versa;
3. all cs-winning strategies are c-winning, but not vice versa;
4. all c-perfect strategies are cs-winning, but not vice versa;
5. all games have a winning (respectively, strongly winning, subgame perfect, c-winning, cs-
winning, c-perfect, optimal, admissible) strategy.
Proof. The containments stated in (1) and (2) are obvious by definition. The fact that those
containments are strict is easily proved by the game in Figure 6 in the Appendix. Similarly,
statements (3) and (4) follow from the definitions and from the example in Figure 7 in the
Appendix.
Regarding statement (5), the existence of a winning (respectively, strongly winning, sub-
game perfect, c-winning, cs-winning, c-perfect, optimal) strategy is obvious by definition. The
existence of an admissible strategy can be derived from Theorem 11 from [Ber07].
3.1 Strongly Winning Strategies
It is easy to check that winning strategies need not be strongly winning. Here, we give a
sufficient condition that a goal can satisfy to ensure that all winning strategies are strongly
winning.
A goal F is shrinkable iff for all cρ ∈ F , with c ∈ N and ρ ∈ Nω, ρ ∈ F . A goal F
is extensible iff for all ρ ∈ F and all c ∈ N, cρ ∈ F . A goal F is prefix-independent iff it is
both shrinkable and extensible. Examples of common prefix-independent goals include Bu¨chi,
co-Bu¨chi and parity goals.
Lemma 2. If a goal F is shrinkable, then, for all games with goal F , all winning paths end
in a winning state, and all c-winning paths end in a c-winning state.
Proof. We prove the statement for winning paths, as the one regarding c-winning paths can
be proved along similar lines. Let G be a game with a shrinkable goal F , let ρ = s0 . . . sn be
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a winning path and let σ be a strategy which is winning from ρ. Consider all infinite paths
that extend ρ and are consistent with σ. These paths all satisfy the goal F . If we remove the
prefix ρ from these paths, they still all satisfy F , since F is shrinkable. Consider the strategy
σ′ defined by: for all pi ∈ S∗,
σ′(pi) =
{
σ(s0 . . . sn−1pi) if first(pi) = sn,
arbitrarily defined otherwise.
It is immediate that σ′ is winning from sn and therefore sn is a winning state.
The following corollary states that if a goal is shrinkable, winning strategies confine the game
in the winning region.
Corollary 1. If a goal is shrinkable, for all winning strategies σ, and for all finite paths ρ
consistent with σ, if first(ρ) is winning then last(ρ) is winning.
Theorem 1. If a goal F is prefix-independent, then, for all games with goal F , all positional
winning strategies are strongly winning, and all positional c-winning strategies are cs-winning.
Proof. We prove the statement for positional winning strategies, as the one regarding posi-
tional c-winning strategies can be proved along similar lines. Let G be a game with goal F ,
and let σ be a winning strategy for G. Let ρ = s0 . . . sn be a winning path which is con-
sistent with σ. By Lemma 2, sn is a winning state. Let ρ
′ = s0 . . . snsn+1 . . . be an infinite
path which extends ρ and is consistent with σ. Since σ is positional and winning from sn,
C(snsn+1 . . .) ∈ F . Since F is extensible, C(ρ
′) ∈ F . Therefore, σ is winning from ρ. Being ρ
generic, we conclude that σ is strongly winning.
The positionality assumption is necessary in the above result. For a prefix-independent goal,
it is easy to devise winning strategies that are not positional and not strongly winning. On
the other hand, being prefix-independent is not necessary for ensuring that all positional
winning strategies are strongly winning. For instance, safety and reachability goals are not
prefix-independent, but they ensure said property. Finally, simple examples show that neither
shrinkability nor extensibility alone can replace prefix-independence in the assumptions of the
above result.
3.2 Admissible Strategies
In this section we provide a characterization of admissibility in terms of the simpler criteria of
strongly winning and cooperatively strongly winning. Such characterization will be useful to
derive further properties of admissible strategies. We start with a trivial property of winning
paths.
Lemma 3. If s0s1 . . . sn is a winning path and sn−1 ∈ S1, then s0s1 . . . sn−1 is a winning
path.
We can now prove the main theorem of this section.
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C-Winning
CS-Winning
C-Perfect
Winning
Strongly Winning
Subgame Perfect
Optimal
Admissible
Fig. 2: Comparing winning criteria.
Theorem 2. A strategy is admissible if and only if it is strongly winning and cooperatively
strongly winning.
Proof. For the “if” part, let σ∗ be a strategy which is both strongly winning and cs-winning.
Assume that there is a strategy σ that is better than σ∗ in at least one case. In particular, let
s be a state and τ be a strategy of Player 2 such that val(s, σ∗, τ) = 0 and val(s, σ, τ) = 1.
We can build a Player 2 strategy τ ′ such that val(s, σ∗, τ ′) = 1 and val(s, σ, τ ′) = 0, thus
proving that σ does not dominate σ∗.
Let αu be the longest prefix common to both Outc(s, σ, τ) and Outc(s, σ∗, τ). Precisely,
let Outc(s, σ, τ) = αuv . . . and Outc(s, σ∗, τ) = αuv∗ . . ., where α ∈ S∗, u, v, v∗ ∈ S, and
v 6= v∗. Clearly, it must be u ∈ S1. We have that αu is not a winning path because σ
∗ is
strongly winning and still val(s, σ∗, τ) = 0. By Lemma 3, αuv is not a winning path either.
We also have that αu is c-winning, because val(s, σ, τ) = 1. Since σ∗ is cs-winning, αuv∗ is
also c-winning.
Then, we define the Player 2 strategy τ ′ as follows. We let τ ′ coincide with τ on all finite
paths that are prefixes of αu. On all paths that are extensions of αuv, we let τ ′ behave in
such a way to ensure that val(s, σ, τ ′) = 0. This is possible because αuv is not a winning
path. On all paths that are extensions of αuv∗, we let τ ′ behave in such a way to ensure that
val(s, σ∗, τ ′) = 1. This is possible because αuv∗ is a c-winning path and σ∗ is cs-winning. We
conclude that σ does not dominate σ∗. Therefore, no strategy dominates σ∗.
Next, we prove the “only if” part. Let σ∗ be an admissible strategy. By contradiction,
assume that σ∗ is not strongly winning. Therefore, there exist a winning path ρ and a strategy
τ∗ such that ρ is consistent with σ∗ and τ∗ and val(ρ, σ∗, τ∗) = 0. Now, let σ be a strategy
that is winning from ρ. Define another Player 1 strategy σ′ as follows, for all pi ∈ S∗:
σ′(pi) =
{
σ(pi) if pi extends ρ,
σ∗(pi) otherwise.
We show that σ′ dominates σ∗, which is a contradiction. Take any Player 2 strategy τ . If σ′ and
τ together do not give rise to the finite path ρ, σ′ behaves exactly like σ∗. If σ′ and τ together
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do give rise to the path ρ, from that point on σ′ behaves like σ, and therefore ensures victory.
This proves that σ′ always performs at least as well as σ∗. Finally, there is a case where σ′
performs better than σ∗: we have val(first(ρ), σ′, τ∗) = 1 and val(first(ρ), σ∗, τ∗) = 0, which
concludes the proof of the contradiction.
Next, we show that σ∗ is cs-winning. Let ρ be a c-winning path and assume by contra-
diction that, for all strategies τ , val(ρ, σ∗, τ) = 0. Let σ•, τ• be a pair of strategies such
that val(ρ, σ•, τ•) = 1. Let σ be a strategy that behaves like σ∗, except that for all paths
extending ρ it behaves like σ•. We prove that σ dominates σ∗. If the path ρ is not formed
during the game, σ behaves exactly like σ∗. If the path ρ is formed, σ∗ loses with certainty,
while σ wins in at least one case, namely against τ•. This proves that σ dominates σ∗, which
is a contradiction.
3.3 Optimal Strategies
A natural notion of good strategy in a losing state is given by optimal strategies in the
corresponding uniform stochastic game (USG). In this section, we explore the relationship
between optimality and the other winning criteria.
First of all, a trivial example (see Figure 5 in the Appendix) shows that neither winning
strategies nor strongly winning strategies nor even admissible strategies need be optimal.
The game in Figure 3 shows that the converse also holds, i.e. optimal strategies need not be
s0 s1 s2
Fig. 3: A game showing that optimal strategies need not be winning.
winning (and therefore neither strongly winning nor admissible). Suppose that the goal is to
reach state s2. In the corresponding USG, both strategies of Player 1 are optimal, yielding a
probability 1 of winning. However, only the strategy that goes directly to s2 is winning. So,
in this case winning proves to be finer (more discriminating) than optimal.
Finally, one might wonder whether starting from losing states optimal strategies are al-
ways admissible. The game in Figure 1, already presented in the introduction, settles this
question in the negative. Suppose the goal is to visit infinitely often s0. All states and all
paths in the game are losing. In the corresponding USG, all strategies have value 0. How-
ever, the strategy that always picks s1 dominates all others, since it has a chance of winning
(namely, against the strategy that always picks s0).
4 Memory
In this section, we study the amount of memory required by “good” strategies for achieving
different kinds of goals. We are particularly interested in identifying those goals which admit
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positional good strategies, because positional strategies are the easiest to implement. The
problem of identifying goals that admit positional winning strategies and positional optimal
strategies is well studied in the literature. Here, we focus on the winning criteria of “strongly
winning” and “admissible”.
4.1 Positional Strongly Winning Strategies
For a game G = (S1, S2, δ, C, F ) and a path ρ = s0 . . . sn in G, define detach(G, ρ) as the game
obtained fromG by adding a copy of the path ρ to it as a chain of new states ending in the orig-
inal state sn. Formally, detach(G, ρ) = (S1, S
′
2, δ
′, C ′, F ), where S′2 = S2 ∪ {s
′
0, s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n−1}
and s′0, s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n−1 are new distinct states not belonging to S2 nor to S1. Then, (s, t) ∈ δ
′
iff either (i) (s, t) ∈ δ, or (ii) s = s′i and t = s
′
i+1, or (iii) s = s
′
n−1 and t = sn. Finally, the
color labeling is defined by:
C ′(s) =
{
C(si) if s = s
′
i for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
C(s) otherwise.
The detach operation adds some states to the game, but the new states are not reachable
from any of the old states. As a consequence, if games G and detach(G, ρ) start from an
old state s, they are indistinguishable to both players. The following lemma formalizes this
observation, by stating in particular that the detach operation preserves the winning property
of paths.
Notice that in the following we commit a slight abuse in language by identifying positional
strategies in G and in detach(G, ρ). This is justified by the fact that the new states introduced
in detach(G, ρ) only have one successor, thus giving no more choices to either player.
Lemma 4. For all strategies σ, and finite paths ρ, ρ′ in G, σ is winning from ρ in G if and
only if it is winning from ρ in detach(G, ρ′).
The following lemma provides the very reason for introducing the detach operation in the
first place. Consider a winning path in the original game G. In order for this path to occur
in a play, we may need the collaboration of Player 2. On the other hand, detaching this
path allows us to force its occurrence, with no help from Player 2. As a consequence, the
initial state s′0 of the detached path is a winning state in the detached game, as stated by
the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let ρ = s0 . . . sn be a path in G and let G
′ = detach(G, ρ). Let s′0 be the new
state added to G′ in correspondence to s0. If ρ is a winning path in G, then s
′
0 is a winning
state in G′.
Proof. Let σ be a strategy that is winning from ρ in G, and let ρ′ = s′0 . . . s
′
n−1sn be the
detachment of ρ added to G′. Define a strategy σ′ in G′ as follows. For all finite paths pi in
G′, if pi extends ρ′, i.e. pi = ρ′pi′, set σ′(pi) = σ(ρpi′). For all other paths in G′, σ′ chooses an
arbitrary move available to Player 1. It is easy to check that the set of infinite paths in G
which are consistent with σ and extend ρ is color-equivalent to the set of infinite paths in G′
which are consistent with σ′ and start in s′0. Therefore, σ
′ is winning from s′0 in G
′.
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With the help of the previous lemmas, we are ready to prove the following.
Theorem 3. A goal is positional if and only if it admits positional subgame perfect strategies.
Proof. The “if” part being obvious by definition, assume that the goal is positional. Let
G be a game and let W be the set of winning paths of G. W may be infinite but it is
certainly countable. Consider any ordering of W into ρ0, ρ1, . . .. Consider the sequence of
games (Gi)i≥0 defined by G0 = G and Gi+1 = detach(Gi, ρi). Additionally, consider the
sequence of strategies (σi)i≥0 defined by: σ0 is any positional winning strategy in G0, and
σi+1 =
{
σi if σi is winning in Gi+1,
any positional winning strategy in Gi+1 otherwise.
We prove that the sequence (σi)i≥0 converges to a strategy σ
∗ within a finite number of steps.
Specifically, we show that once a strategy σ occurs in the sequence and then is replaced by
another one, it will not occur at any later point in the sequence. This fact, together with the
fact that the number of positional strategies is finite, leads to the convergence of the sequence.
Assume by contradiction that there exist indices 0 ≤ a < b such that σa 6= σa+1 6= σb and
σa = σb. Since σa 6= σa+1, σa is not winning in Ga+1. Therefore, by repeated application of
Lemma 4, σa (or equivalently, σb) cannot be winning in Gb, which is a contradiction.
Next, we prove that σ∗ is subgame perfect in G. Let ρ = s0 . . . sn be a winning path in G.
There is an index j > 0 such that Gj = detach(Gj−1, ρ). Let s
′
0 be the “copy” of s0 added to
Gj by the detach operation. Since ρ is a winning path in G, by Lemma 4 it is still winning in
Gj−1, and by Lemma 5 s
′
0 is a winning state in Gj . Therefore, σj is winning from s
′
0. Since
σ∗ is the ultimate value for the sequence of strategies, σ∗ is also winning from s′0. Take an
infinite path ρ′ in G, which extends ρ and that after ρ is consistent with σ∗. If we replace
in ρ′ the prefix ρ with s′0 . . . s
′
n−1sn, we obtain an infinite path ρ
′′ in Gj , which is consistent
with σ∗ (because σ∗ is positional) and color-equivalent to ρ′. Since σ∗ is winning from s′0,
C(ρ′′) ∈ F and therefore C(ρ′) ∈ F , which concludes the proof.
Notice, however, that there are games with non-positional goals that have a positional winning
strategy but no positional subgame perfect strategy. An immediate consequence of the above
theorem is the following.
Corollary 2. A goal is positional if and only if it admits strongly winning strategies.
4.2 Positional Admissible Strategies
Since all admissible strategies are winning, admissible strategies require at least as much
memory as winning strategies. The following example shows that there are goals which admit
positional winning strategies, but do not admit positional admissible strategies.
Example 1. Consider the goal which requires to visit at least twice color 1 (in Ltl notation,
ϕ = ✸(1 ∧ X✸1)). Such goal is positional, as it satisfies the criterion of [GZ05].
Consider the game in Figure 4, with the above goal ϕ. In the figure, the color of each state
appears next to it or above it. One can easily check that states s0 and s3 are winning, while
11
s0
1
s1
0
s3 1
s2 0
s4
1
s5
0
Fig. 4: Positional goals need not admit positional admissible strategies.
all others are losing. The only choice for Player 1 occurs in s1, where he can choose between
s2 and s4. If the game starts in s0, in order to ensure victory, Player 1 must choose s4 after
s1. On the other hand, suppose that the game starts in s1. State s1 is cooperatively winning,
since both players can cooperate and achieve victory by following the path s1s2s3s4s
ω
5 . By
Theorem 2 for a strategy to be admissible it has to be both winning and cooperatively winning.
Thus, Player 1 must choose s2 after s1, if the game started in s1 itself. In conclusion, the
choice of any admissible strategy from s1 depends on the past history of the game.
In the following, we give a sufficient condition to ensure that a goal admits positional
admissible strategies. We start with a simple algorithm, which we later show yields positional
admissible strategies for many goals of interest.
Computing positional admissible strategies. Suppose that we are given a game G with
a positional goal F , and that we have an algorithm for computing the set of winning states
and a positional winning strategy for all games with goal F . Consider the following procedure.
1. Compute the set of winning states Win and a positional winning strategy σ for G.
2. Remove from G the edges of Player 1 which start in Win and do not belong to σ.
3. In the resulting game, compute and return a positional cooperatively winning strategy.
In general, this procedure may return a strategy that is neither winning nor cooperatively
winning. However, in the following we show that indeed it returns a strategy that is both
winning and cooperatively winning in many cases of interest.
As far as the complexity of the procedure is concerned, assuming the usual graph-like
adjacency-list representation for games, we obtain the same asymptotical complexity as find-
ing a positional winning strategy for F . In particular, step 3 can easily be performed by
attributing all states to Player 1 and then running the algorithm for a positional winning
strategy.
In the following, we prove that for prefix-independent positional goals the above procedure
returns an admissible strategy.
Theorem 4. If a goal is positional and prefix-independent, then it admits positional admis-
sible strategies.
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Proof. Let G be a game with goal F , where F is positional and prefix-independent. Let Win
be the set of winning state of G, and consider the application of the above procedure to G.
Let σ1 be the strategy computed at step 1 of the procedure, and σ3 the output strategy.
Clearly, σ3 is positional. We prove that it is also admissible. According to Theorems 1 and 2,
it is sufficient to prove that σ3 is winning and cooperatively winning.
By Corollary 1, whenever the game starts in a winning state, σ1 confines the game in
Win. Since σ3 coincides with σ1 on Win, σ3 is winning.
Next, let G2 be the game built at Step 2 of the procedure. We know that σ3 is cooperatively
winning in G2. We now prove that σ3 is cooperatively winning in G. Let s be a cooperatively
winning state in G. We prove that s is cooperatively winning in G2 as well. Let σ, τ be a
pair of strategies in G such that C(Outc(s, σ, τ)) ∈ F . We consider the following two cases:
(1) the infinite path Outc(s, σ, τ) does not visit Win; then, strategies σ and τ are valid in
G2 and thus s is cooperatively winning in G2; (2) let ρ be the shortest prefix of Outc(s, σ, τ)
which ends in Win; then, consider a new strategy σ′ which behaves as follows, for all pi ∈ S∗:
σ′(pi) =
{
σ1(pi) if pi extends ρ,
σ(pi) otherwise.
Consider strategies σ′ and τ playing together in G2. At first, σ
′ behaves like σ and so the path
ρ is built. Then, σ′ behaves like the winning strategy σ1. Eventually, the infinite path ρρ
′ is
built, where C(last(ρ)ρ′) ∈ F . Since F is extensible, C(ρρ′) ∈ F and thus s is cooperatively
winning in G2.
This result proves that common goals such as Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi, and parity all admit positional
admissible strategies. However, prefix-independence is not necessary for admitting positional
admissible strategy. Further, it is not necessary for the procedure to work either. In particular,
it is easy to prove that the procedure also returns an admissible strategy for reachability and
safety goals.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We studied and compared several criteria for establishing what are the preferable strategies
for Player 1 in a given game. Being winning, or rather strongly winning, intuitively seems
to be a necessary prerequisite for any best-effort strategy. Accordingly, optimality against
a random opponent should be discarded as it does not imply winning. However, for some
applications it could be worth considering a strategy which is primarily strongly winning,
and optimal from paths that are not winning. Admissibility, on the other hand, passes all
our tests, including the one of being efficiently computable for goals of interest. On the other
hand, in general admissibility incurs some memory cost.
This preliminary study leaves several open problems, including: characterizing goals hav-
ing positional admissible strategies, finding algorithms for computing strongly winning and
admissible strategies for goals that are not prefix-independent.
Aside from the goal-independent best-effort criteria studied in this paper, it is worth
noticing that goal-specific criteria offer an entirely different range of possibilities, many of
which remain unexplored in the literature.
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Appendix: Additional Examples
s0
s1s2
s3s4s5s6
Fig. 5: Admissible strategies need not be optimal. The goal is to reach s4. All strategies of
Player 1 are winning, strongly winning and admissible. On the other hand, only the strategy
that chooses s1 is optimal, leading to a probability of winning of
1
2
.
s0
1
s1
2
Fig. 6: A game having a winning strategy which is not strongly winning, and a strongly
winning strategy which is not subgame perfect. The goal is ϕ = 1 ∧ ✸✷2. The positional
strategy consisting of going from s1 to s0 (the thick edge) is winning but not strongly winning.
The strategy that chooses s1 when the current history contains exactly one occurrence of s0,
and chooses s0 otherwise is strongly winning but not subgame perfect, due for instance to
the winning path s0s1s0s1.
s0
1
s1
0
s2
0
s3
2
Fig. 7: A game having a c-winning strategy which is not cs-winning, and a cs-winning strategy
which is not c-perfect. The goal is ϕ = 1∧✸✷2. The only c-winning state is s0. The positional
strategy s0 → s1, s2 → s2 is c-winning but not cs-winning. Consider the strategy that chooses
s0 → s1 and then (i) s2 → s1 if s1 was visited in the current history and (ii) s2 → s2 if s1
was not visited in the current histoy. Such strategy is cs-winning but not c-perfect, due to
the c-winning path s0s2.
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s0
0
s1
1
s2
2
s3
0
s4
3
s5
4
Fig. 8: A game having a positional strongly winning strategy, but no positional subgame
perfect strategy. The goal is ϕ = 0 ∧
(
(✸1 ∧ ✸3) ∨ (✸2 ∧ ✸4)
)
. The positional strategy
s0 → s1, s3 → s4 is strongly winning. All subgame perfect strategies need memory in state
s3.
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